US Coast Guard is skeptical of LNG safety

 

The Oregonian reported the following on June 26, 2014:

“I’m very skeptical that anything can be done in a near-shore tsunami” to protect the tanker,” said Randy Clark, a security specialist with the U.S. Coast Guard. “There simply isn’t enough time. … There are no real regulations. There is no requirement to mitigate this risk.”

Zones of Concern” for Intentional LNG Spills from Vessels Up to 265,000 m 3 Cargo Capacity Enclosure (9) to NVIC 01-2011

  1. Introduction. The 2004 Sandia Labs Report (SAND2004-6258) identified three concentric, circular Zones of Concern for intentional spills from liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers. That report, coupled with a Sandia study conducted in 2007 for larger volume LNG tankers (SAND2008-3153), indicated the hazard zone sizes described below can be used for LNG vessels with a cargo carrying capacity of up to 265,000 m 3. Captains of the Port may find the hazard zone size information and data particularly useful when reviewing an applicant s Waterway Suitability Assessment (WSA) and in making a recommendation to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on the suitability of a waterway to support LNG marine traffic associated with a proposed project. Where the applicant s WSA reveals that potential impacts on public safety and property could be high and where interactions with shore terrain or structures could occur, modern, validated computational fluid dynamics (CFD) models may be used to improve analysis of the site-specific hazards, consequences and risks. Applicants desiring to conduct refined modeling analysis should contact the Coast Guard s Office of Operating and Environmental Standards, Commandant (CG-522), for assistance.
  2. Description of Hazard Zones.
  3. Zone 1. This is the area with the most severe consequences around the LNG tanker, where an LNG spill could pose a severe public safety and property hazard and could damage or significantly disrupt critical infrastructure and key assets located within this area. Zone 1 is considered to extend about 500 m (0.3 miles) for an intentional breach of an LNG tanker. Risk mitigation strategies should address vapor cloud dispersion and fire hazards. The most rigorous protective and preventive deterrent measures should be considered when major critical infrastructure elements, such as population or commercial centers, lie within Zone 1. These measures should include such things as vessel security zones, waterway traffic management, and establishment of positive control over vessels. Coordination among all port security stakeholders is essential. Incident management and emergency response measures should be carefully evaluated to ensure adequate resources (i.e., firefighting, salvage) are available for consequence and risk mitigation.
  4. Zone 2. This is an area with less severe consequences than Zone 1 and is considered to extend from 500 m (0.3 miles) to 1,600 m (1 mile) for an intentional breach of an LNG tanker. Risk mitigation strategies should address vapor cloud dispersion and fire hazards. When major critical infrastructure elements occur within Zone 2, risk management strategies that should be considered include incident management and emergency response measures that ensure areas of refuge (enclosed areas, buildings) are available, the development of community warning procedures, and education programs to ensure that communities are aware of precautionary measures.
  5. Zone 3. This is an area with the least likelihood of severe consequences and is considered to extend from 1,600 m (1 mile) to a conservative maximum of 3,500 m (2.2 miles) from the LNG tanker (in the unlikely event that 3 cargo tanks were breached and a vapor cloud disperses without an initial ignition). Risk mitigation strategies should address the vapor cloud dispersion hazard.

When major critical infrastructure elements occur within Zone 3,

       52.  Enclosure (9) to NVIC 01-2011 “Zones of Concern” for Intentional LNG Spills from Vessels Up to 265,000 m 3 Cargo Capacity risk management strategies that should be considered include incident         management and emergency response measures that ensure areas of refuge are available and community education programs should be considered to ensure that people know what to do in the            unlikely event of the release of a vapor cloud without initial ignition.

http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2014/06/coos_bay_lng_terminal_designed.html